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The Prospects for an International
Criminal Court in the 1990s
Joel Cavicchia*
I.

Introduction

An International Criminal Court (ICC), with the power to assert jurisdiction over international crimes, has been the subject of
extensive debate throughout this century. The very concept has
evoked a range of disparate responses, from those who view it as a
realistic goal to those who view it as chimerical grist for academic
mills. Focus on this issue, triggered to some degree by the recent
Gulf War, has rekindled the debate. This article explores the possibility of creating an ICC which stakes a middle ground between idealism and skepticism.
This article proceeds as follows: Part II consists of a historical
overview of past efforts to create an ICC. Part III discusses the reasons that the 1990s may be a particularly propitious time for development of an ICC-namely, increased global receptiveness to. an
ICC, the continued expansion of international terrorism, and the
Gulf War, which has prompted more review of the role of international tribunals than at any time since the end of World War II.
Part III also includes a review of the arguments for and against creation of an ICC. Arguments supporting an ICC-its potential for
the maintenance of a global legal order, and its ability to serve as a
worthy substitute to domestic courts in certain- instances-are measured against the charges that ICC development remains an unworkable and idealistic vision. Part IV recognizes that a viable ICC
would require nations to derogate from fundamental notions of state
sovereignty and addresses three areas where ICC intrusion on state
sovereignty would be most pronounced: subject matter jurisdiction,
personal jurisdiction, and the rights of criminal defendants. Part V
discusses the basic organization of an ICC and focuses upon four
specific areas: possible association with the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), the qualifications for ICC judges, the bureaucratic
make-up of an ICC, and the degree of national assistance with those
B.A., Fordham University, 1974; J.D., Loyola University of New Orleans, 1978;
LL.M. (International and Comparative Law), Georietown University Law Center, 1991.

DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 10:2

nations subject to the ICC's jurisdiction. Finally, Part VI concludes
with a general summary and a reaffirmation that a modestly planned
ICC would set the groundwork for a more ambitious international
criminal tribunal in the future.
Historical Overview

II.

International courts were not in existence during the Middle
Ages. Cases consisting of an international nature, such as those relating to the law of arms, were submitted to individual sovereigns.'
The first international tribunal was held in 1474. Peter Von
Hagenbush was appointed by Duke Charles of Burgundy as Governor of Breisach, an Austrian possession pledged to the Duke. Von
Hagenbush was captured by the Austrians and was tried and convicted by a court for crimes against "God and man," following his
reign of terror over the citizens of Breisach.2
Some international tribunals were created in the nineteenth century and were empowered to destroy or confiscate vessels engaged in
the slave trade. These courts were established pursuant to treaties
between Great Britain and other nations. The masters and crews of
these vessels were not tried in these tribunals, but were delivered to
their respective nations for punishment under domestic law. At the
close of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth
century, various European river commissions were given territorial or
quasi-territorial jurisdictions.'
After World War I, the Treaty of Versailles contained provisions for an international tribunal. Article 227 required the public
arraignment of William 11 of Hohenzollern for the "supreme offense
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties."' Article
228 provided for German recognition of the Allied and Associated
Powers' right to bring before the military tribunal persons accused of
having committed "acts in violation of the laws of war." 5 A special
tribunal was to be composed of five judges from the United States;
Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.6
Attempts to put these articles into force failed. Following William II's flight to the Netherlands at the end of World War I, the
Dutch government declined to extradite William II, alleging that the
KEEN. THE. LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 23 (1965).
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI. A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, I! INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 462 (1968).
3. M. HUDSON. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS. PAST AND FUTURE 183 (1972).

I.

M.

2.

4. Id.
5. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919, Ii Martens
Nouveau Recueil (3d) 323, (entered into force on Jan. 10, 1920).
6. Id.

Winter 1992]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

offenses with which he was charged, were political and not punishable under Dutch law. 7 The Allies' reluctance to press for prosecution
of Hohenzollern and others accused of war crimes under Article 228,
was based upon a fear that prosecution would stir an uprising in
Germany, 8 or even start a new war with the Allies. 9
Despite the failure to bring William II before an international
tribunal, initiatives for an International Criminal Court persisted
during the 1920s. Several conferences of the International Law Association (ILA) addressed the issue,"0 and the ILA's Permanent International Court Committee enacted a draft statute for an ICC in
1926. 1 The Committee noted its interest in the prospective remedial
effects of an ICC, as opposed to retroactive applications of an ICC
to the recently ended war12
The assassinations of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and
French Prime Minister Louis Barthou prompted initiatives for an
ICC to take a different direction, as the League of Nations considered the possibility of an ICC for the prosecution of crimes involving
international terrorism.13 In fact, the League of Nations adopted a
convention on terrorism which provided for an ICC.' 4 However, the
15
convention did* not go into effect due to insufficient ratifications.
Following this failed initiative,"6 efforts to establish an ICC under
the direction of the League of Nations were halted due to the increased ineffectiveness of the League of Nations in the years immediately preceding World War 11.17
During World War II, protests against the atrocities committed
by the Nazis in Europe 8 caused the concept of an ICC to resur7. R. WOETZEL. THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1960).
8. Id.
9. J. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBURG 113 (1982).
10. See A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, International Law Association, 31st Conference, Buenos Aires, Aug. 24 - Aug. 30, 1922 (available in Report of the 31st
Conference of the International Law Association (1923)); DRAFT STATUTE FOR THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, International Law Association, 33rd Conference,
Stockholm, Sept. 8 - Sept. 13, 1924, in Report of the 33rd Conference of the International
Law Association (1925).
11. See REPORT OF THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, International
Law Association, 34th Conference, Vienna, Aug. 5- Aug. 11, 1926 (available in Report of the
34th Conference of the International Law Association (1927)) [hereinafter 1926 ILA Draft].
12. id.
13. Gross, International Terrorism and International Jurisdiction, 67 AM. J. INT'L L.
508 (1973).
14. League of Nations, Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court,
opened for signature at Geneva, November 16, 1937, C. 547(1), M. 384(1), 1937 (V), reprinted in M. HUDSON, 7 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION (1909-1945) 878 (1941). This was
never entered into force.
15. See M. HUDSON, supra note 3.
16. For a discussion of some of the problems experienced in this Convention, see Blischenko & Shdanov, The Problems of International Jurisdiction, XIV 1976 CANADIAN Y.B.
INT'L L. 283, 285 (Canadian Branch, Int'l L.A.).
17. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 2.
18. Finch, Retribution for War Crimes, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 81 (1943).
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face.19 In 1942 the Allies met at London's St. James Palace to declare their intent to prosecute the Nazis for war crimes.2" In 1943
this intent was reaffirmed by the United States, Great Britain, and
the Soviet Union in Moscow. 2 On August 8, 1945, the Allies entered into an agreement establishing an international military tribunal for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals
of the European Axis.22 The tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction
consisted of crimes committed against peace, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and conspiracy to commit any of these crimes.2 3
On January 19, 1946, the Allies established a similar tribunal for
Japanese war crimes in the Far East.2 4
Following these tribunals held in Nuremberg and Tokyo, debate
arose over the propriety of the proceedings, especially on the issue of
whether the convicted defendants had been charged with offenses
recognized under international law. 25 Despite this concern, the sentiment prevailed that these trials could serve as a starting point for
sweeping prosecution of international crimes, 26 with an ICC being a
19. Glueck, Tribunalfor War Offenders, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1089 (1943).
20. E. JANECZEK. NUREMBURG JUDGMENT IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13
(1949).
21. Id.
22. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.TS. 279, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472.
23. Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal defines these crimes
as follows:
(a)CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a Common
Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b)WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war.
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment
or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c)CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions
on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution
of such plan.
I PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 11 (1949).
24. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, and amended Apr.
26, 1946, 4 Bevans 20, T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
25. R. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 34-73 (1961); April,
An Inquiry into the JudicialBasis for the Nuremburg War Crimes Trial, 30 MINN. L. REV.
313 (1946).
26. Carter, The Nurnberg Trials: A Turning Point in the Enforcement of International
Law, 28 NEB. L. REV. 370 (1949); Mignone, After Nuremberg, Tokyo, 25 TEx. L, REV. 475
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distinct possibility2" and with the newly established United Nations
serving as a means to accomplish this goal.2 8 Sentiment was so
favorable that, in a closely related issue, President Harry S. Truman
expressed enthusiasm over the possible codification of international
criminal law. 29
On December 9, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly,
pursuant to Resolution 260 B III, invited the International Law
Commission (ILC) "to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons
charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdictions will
be conferred upon that organization by international conventions." 30
Two reports were prepared by special rapporteurs, Ricardo J.Alfaro3" and Emil Sandstrum.1 2 The ILC thereafter determined that
the establishment of an ICC charged with jurisdiction over genocide
and other crimes was a desirable goal, but did not recommend the
establishment of a criminal chamber within the International Court
33
of Justice (ICJ).
The General Assembly reviewed the ILC's report and appointed
a special committee, comprised of representatives of seventeen Member States, to prepare a preliminary draft convention and proposal
relating to the creation of an ICC. 34 The special committee submitted a draft proposal in 19511 and a revised draft in 1953.38
Following its review of these drafts, the General Assembly decided to postpone consideration of an ICC pending the General Assembly's disposition of two separate yet related ideas: the United
Nations' initiative on a "draft code of offenses against the peace and
security of mankind" (hereinafter draft code of offenses), and the
United Nations' work in defining the term "aggression," a key term
37
in the draft code of offenses.
(1947).
27. Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 72 (1947).
28. Shick, The Nuremberg Trial and Future International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 770,
794 (1947).
29. Letter to Francis Biddle in Response to His Report on the Nuremberg Tribunal,
1946 PUB.PAPERS 480, 481 (Nov. 12, 1946).
30. G.A. Res. 260 B (I1) at 177, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
31. Questions of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report by Ricardo J. Alfaro,
[1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/15 (1950).
32. Questions of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report by Emil Sandstrum,
[1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/20 (1950).
33. Report of the International Law Commission, 5, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12), U.N.
Doc. A/1316 (1950).
34. Report of the International Law Commission, 5 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/1639
(1950).
35. 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 11), U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952) [hereinafter 1951 ILC
Draft].
36. 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12), U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954) [hereinafter 1953 ILC
Draft].
37. G.A. Res. 898, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954);
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This domino-like effect resulted in extensive delay, and the General Assembly did not adopt a consensus resolution on the term "aggression" until 1974.38 Following the resumption by the ILC of work
on a draft code of offenses, the ILC in 1983 indicated to the General
Assembly that resumption of effort to draft a code of offenses would
be ineffective if unaccompanied by an international criminal jurisdiction.3" This issue was raised by the ILC at subsequent sessions.4"
While the General Assembly has never directly responded to the
its inILC request, it had indicated, through a series of resolutions,
4
terest in the ILC resumption of efforts to develop an ICC. '
In 1990 the ILC incorporated an examination of numerous options relating to the development of an ICC in a draft report on its
work in its 42nd session in Geneva.4 2 In this report, the ILC found'
that its examination of the questions of an ICC revealed broad
agreement that a permanent ICC should be created in a relationship
with the United Nations system.43 These recent efforts have on occasion been assailed as making scant progress, especially when viewed
in terms of the United Nations efforts which began over forty years
44
ago.
Apart from the ILC efforts, the International Institute of
Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences submitted a comprehensive
draft statute for an ICC at the Eighth United Nations Congress on
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in
Havana, Cuba from August 27 .to September 7, 1990." This draft,
modeled after an earlier effort by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, 4
had been designed to implement the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.47
G.A. Res. 1181, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 51, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957); G.A. Res.
1186, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 51, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957); G.A. Res. 1187, 12
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957).
38. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/38/10
(1983).
39. 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) para. (c)(i), U.N. Doc. A/38/10 (1983).
40. 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) paras. 146 to 148, 185, U.N. Doc. A/41/10 (1986);
42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) paras. 29 to 36, 67(c), footnote 28, U.N. Doc. A/42/10
(1987); 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), para. 280, commentary to art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/43/10
(1988); 44 U.N GAOR Supp. (No. 10) paras. 211 to 216, U.N. Doc. A/44/10 (1989).
41. G.A. Res. 43/164, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 280, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988); G.A. Res. 44/32, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 304, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989).
42. Draft Code Against The Peace and Security of Mankind: Report of The Working
Group Established Pursuant To The Request From the General Assembly to The International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.454 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 ILC Draft].
43. Id.
44. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 11.
45. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/NGO ISISC (1990) [hereinafter Havana Draft].
46. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/22 CRP.19/REV.1 (1980); reprinted in Bassiouni and Derby,
Final Report on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant International Instruments, 9 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 523 (1981) [hereinafter Apartheid Draft].
47. G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
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Finally, non-government organizations have persisted in efforts
to create an ICC. The ILA drafted a statute for an ICC which, in
some respects has circumvented the obstacles which have delayed the
United Nations efforts."'
III. Arguments For and Against the Creation of an International
Criminal Court
Given the almost glacial pace of development of an ICC, it is
important to determine why the 1990s may be a propitious time for
an ICC. Three reasons are presented for the proposition that a permanent ICC may be a more attainable goal now than it was in the
past.
The first reason is the increased receptivity by the global community. During the United Nations' early work on draft proposals
for an International Criminal Court, some nations expressed concern
that its establishment would be inconsistent with national sovereignty, while others felt such a proposal was simply impractical. " "
These concerns were compounded by fear that an ICC would have
jurisdiction over political crimes and would provoke a clash of cultural and ideological differences.5" This problem was of particular
concern to the Soviet Union where, in the 1950s, legal scholars
struggled with the issue of how the application of international law
could be reconciled with the separate yet competing economic ideologies of Capitalism and Marxism. 5 '
As recently as 1974, Professor Richard N. Gardner, writing in
Foreign Affairs magazine, argued that few people retained any confidence in global strategies and that "the consensus on basic values
and willingness to entrust vital interests to community judgment
clearly do not exist."5 2 Yet, fourteen years later, he noted that the
times were ripe for constructive multilateral cooperation through international organizations, prompted by several key forces: the United
States' relative decline in international power which has necessitated
48. See DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL INQUIRY
AND A DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, International Law Association, 60th Conference, Montreal, August 29-September 4, 1982 in Report of the 60th Conference of the International Law Association (1983); DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL INQUIRY AND A DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, International Law Association 61st Conference, Paris, August 26-September 1,

1984, in Report of the 61 st Conference of the International Law Association (1984) [hereinafter 1984 ILA Draft).
49. See 1953 ILA Draft, supra note 36, general principles, para. 17 at 4.
50. Wright, The Scope of InternationalLaw: A Conceptual Framework, 15 VA. J. INT'L
L. 561, 567-75 (1975) [hereinafter The Scope].
51. R FALK, REVIVING TH4E WORLD COURT 5 (1986); Kulski, The Soviet Interpretation
of InternationalLaw, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 518 (1955).
52. Gardner, The Hard Road to World Order, 52 FOREIGN AFF. 556 (1974) [hereinafter World].
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a larger share of economic and political power with Europe, Japan,
and the developing world; a "creeping moderation" of many third
world countries gradually developing an interest in free markets,
human rights, and respect for international obligations; and the dramatic changes in communist powers, which had long presented major impediments to the development of international organizations
53
during the post war period.

The increased receptiveness to an ICC has been seen on many
fronts. In September 1987 the former General Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, submitted a letter to the United Nations proposing a tribunal, established under the auspices of the United Nations, to investigate acts
of international terrorism. 51 On September 25, 1990, Eduard A.
Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, submitted a statement to the United Nations
General Assembly indicating that it was imperative to create a new
legal environment "inwhich anyone guilty of grave crimes against
humanity, or participating in atrocities, in taking hostages, acts of
terrorism or torture, and those guilty of particular ruthlessness in the
use of force, could not escape punishment."55
Interest has similarly been evident in the Western hemisphere.
In his inaugural address on August 7, 1990, President Caesar
Gaviria Trujillo of Columbia indicated an interest to "explore the
possibility of creating an international or regional criminal jurisdiction to fight narcotrafficking and other related crimes that surpass
international borders."156 The Permanent Representative of Trinidad

and Tobago to the United Nations General Assembly requested that
the forty-fourth session agenda include an initiative to establish an
ICC with jurisdiction over crimes involving illicit trafficking of narcotics across national frontiers and other transnational activities. 7
This request was prompted by a "desire to foster increased regional
and international cooperation in criminal justice administration and
the speedy public trial of transnational offenders through acceptable
investigative and judicial procedures.

'5

8

Regarding United States legislation, the Omnibus Security and
53. Gardner, The Case for Practical Internationalism, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 827 (1988)
[hereinafter Internationalism].
54. Quigley, Perestroika and International Law, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 788, 794 (1988).
55. Address by Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Forty-Fifth Session of the General Assembly
of the United Nations, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at AI0.
56. Inaugural address by President Caesar Gaviria Trujillo, Bogota, Columbia (Aug. 7,
1990).
57. Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Ms. Marjorie R. Thorpe, Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Nov. 10, 1989) [hereinafter Thorpe].
58. Id.
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Terrorism Act of 1986 decreed that the President should consider
"the possibility of eventually establishing an international tribunal
for prosecuting terrorists. ' 59 In the 101st Congress, several bills were
introduced which encouraged the President to enter into negotiations
for the creation of an ICC to combat international drug trade,6 ° and
which called for the Attorney General to pursue the establishment of
an ICC for acts of terrorism, drug-trafficking, genocide, and torture.6" On November 5, 1990, President George Bush signed into
law the Foreign Operations Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991,
which contained an amendment calling for the President to report to
Congress by October 1, 1991, the results of his efforts regarding the
establishment of an ICC to deal with criminal acts defined in international conventions.62
The United States Department of State has voiced guarded interest in the proposals for an ICC. On June 16, 1988, when testifying before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Secretary of State George Schultz said
that the creation of an ICC was an "important possibility."6 " Two
years later, Secretary Schultz's successor, James Baker, appeared
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and, when asked about
the possibility of establishing an ICC, he said that "the suggestion is
a good one."6 4 Shortly thereafter, Undersecretary of State, Robert
Kimmett, appeared before the same committee and, during a discussion of international criminal jurisdiction, he stated that "the time is
probably riper than ever to look at that situation." 5
The second reason that the 1990s may be an appropriate time
for the creation of an International Criminal Court is the increased
perception that criminal activity relating to drug trafficking and terrorism is taking on an increasingly global dimension.66 The conviction that this type of expanding criminal activity is extending beyond
59.

Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Terrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 1986

U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEWS (100 Stat.) 853.

60. H.R. Con. Res. 66, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H529 (1989); S. Res.
218, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S16, 682 (1989).
61. H.R. 3355, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H6269 (1989).
62. H.R. 5114, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 136 CONG. REC. S16,216-SI6,217 (1990).
63. Appropriationsfor Foreign Assistance and Related Programsfor the Fiscal Year
ending September 30, 1989; Hearings on H.R. 4637 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 312 (1988) (statement
of George P. Schultz, Sec'y, DEPT. STATE).
64. Hearings on the Crisis in the Persian Gulf Before the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 26 (1990) (statement of James A. Baker, III, Sec'y, DEPT.
STATE).

65. Chronology of Proposals for an International Criminal Court Feb. 13, 1978-Nov. 5,
1990 (unclassified) (available in office of Senator Arlen Specter).
66. Oakley, Terrorism: Overview and Developments, DEPT. ST. BULL., Nov. 1985, at 6164; Note, The ExtraterritorialWar on Cocaine: Perspectivesfrom Bolivia and Columbia 12
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 39 (1988) (authored by Mary Ellen Welch).
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national borders has prompted renewed interest in an ICC.17
The third reason is the recent Gulf War, which has created an
atmosphere conducive to serious deliberation on the possibilities of
an ICC. In the wake of President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and allegations of criminal activity, an outcry has arisen for
war crimes trials. 8 This call has been particularly forceful in the
United States Congress where the Senate overwhelmingly endorsed
the possibility of trying President Hussein before an international
tribunal.6 9 At the onset of the 102nd Congress, several bills were
immediately introduced urging the establishment of an international
military tribunal to prosecute President Hussein and his subordinates
for war crimes during the invasion of Kuwait, missile attacks against
Israel, and the capture and alleged mistreatment of prisoners of
war. 70 While Part IV discusses the reasons why war crimes trials are
too politically sensitive for the narrowly limited jurisdiction of the
permanent ICC proposed in this article, it is nonetheless encouraging
that the issue of the viability of international criminal tribunals, in
general, has become a matter of public debate in the Gulf War's
aftermath.
In a world fraught with imperfection, awaiting the perfect moment for creation of an ICC would be an undertaking of infinite duration. However, if there is any merit to the assertions that 1990 has
been an "annus mirabilis," conducive to the development of a more
constructive world order, 71 or that the United Nations has undergone
a rebirth which fosters "qualitatively new prospects for the development of international law, ' 72 a permanent ICC could be a worthy
test to the merit of those pronouncements.
If the era of 1990s is a more hospitable time for reconsideration
of an ICC than in the past decades, a re-examination of the benefits
or pitfalls that the creation of an ICC might provide is essential.
After the two World Wars, certain crimes were considered so destructive of world peace and order that the creation of an international world tribunal to punish such crimes was deemed imperative. 73
67. Wilkinson, Wanted: An International Criminal Court, WORLD PRESS REV. 22
(1986).
68. Kamen, Geneva Conventions Basis of Allies Charges, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1991, at
AI 9, col. 3. See also Seib, Bush Hints U.S. to Seek War Crimes Trial of Iraq's Leaders for
col. 1.
Actions in Kuwait, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1990, at A8,
69. H.R. 5241, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 12,784-12,813 (1990).
70. H.R. Con. Res. 66, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 Cong. Rec. H684 (1991); S. Con.
Res. 7, 102nd Cong., IstSess., 137 Cong. Rec. S1286-87 (1991); S. Res. 15, 102nd Cong., Ist
Sess., 137 Cong. Rec. S1007 (1991).
71. Howard, The Springtime of Nations, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 17, 32 (1990).
72. Entin, A Stronger U.N. as a Means of Consolidating and Democratizing the International Legal Order, 2 INT'L REV. CONTEMP. L. 21, 26 (1989).
73. Wright, Proposalfor an International Criminal Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L 60, 63
(1952).
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This conviction was especially strong where such crimes were condoned or even sanctioned by the governments whose nationals were
charged with the offenses. 7" After World War II, this feeling was
heightened by a growing fear over the development of weapons of
increased destructive power" 5 and the belief that a more effective
76
world order could be attained through a permanent ICC.
A concern, moreover, of the increase in crimes of an international nature caused some commentators to deem an ICC to be indispensable. Terrorism, for example, is considered best combatted by
using an ICC as an alternate jurisdiction, when political impediments preclude successful prosecutions in national courts. 77 This reason is considered increasingly attractive when a national legal system
is perceived as ineffective in prosecuting certain crimes. 78 The recent
inability of some South American nations to prosecute drug traffickers reflects the current scope of this problem. 9
The accused has also been perceived as the potential beneficiary
of an ICC. It has been argued that, in certain instances, such a court
might provide an accused a better chance for an equitable trial than
he might otherwise experience in a national court.8"
These proposed advantages are afforded no immunity from the
criticism that arises in a variety of directions. For example, this
question has been raised. What motivation would a nation have to
turn over an accused to an ICC, if that nation had the inclination
neither to prosecute nor to extradite the accused?81 Some fears have
been voiced that an ICC would hinder other law enforcement endeavors by glamorizing the accused's position by providing him with
an international forum.8 2 There is also the apprehension that an ICC
may prove to be no more than a mere dumping ground for politically
expedient cases.8"
Additionally, there has long existed an undercurrent of belief
among some writers that an ICC is an idealistic vision which, while
at some future period may be an engaging possibility, is clearly inconsistent with the hard boiled realities of the present age. In the
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 63.
The Scope, supra note 50, at 575-76.
The Scope, supra note 50, at 576.

77.

J. MURPHY. LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 54 (1980).

78. See Thorpe, supra note 57, at 4.
79. Robbins, How Cocaine Rules the Law in Columbia, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP.,
Feb. 8, 1988, at 28, 29; see also Farah, Judge Frees Drug Trafficker Under Columbia's New
Rules, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1991, at A5.
80. See Remarks by Alwyn V. Freeman, American Society of International Law, 66th
Annual Meeting, Washington, April 27 - April 29, 1972 (available in Proceedings of the 66th
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law at 243 (1972)).
81. Press Release USUN 145 - (89), United States Mission to the United Nations
(Nov. 14, 1989) [hereinafter Mission].
82. Id.
83. Id.
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midst of World War 11, Manley 0. Hudson wrote that "the time is
hardly ripe for the extension of international law to include judicial
process for condemning and punishing acts either of states or individuals." 8 4 With the beginning of the Cold War and increased tension arising from the threat of nuclear confrontation, an ICC was
considered an extremely remote prospect.8 5
When, in 1968, Professor Charles Dalfen reviewed the effectiveness of the International Court of Justice, he wrote that its assessment required "an examination of how states see and assess the
Court and the Court situation and the risk they see to their interests
in that situation." 8 6 This observation is equally appropriate when debating the merits of an International Criminal Court, for such debate often entails review of those features of an ICC which a nation
would find most attractive, and those a nation would find most detrimental. The successful creation of an ICC will depend upon the ability to strike a balance between the "chaos" feared by ICC opponents
and the "millenial justice" all too frequently envisioned by its
advocates.
IV.

The International Criminal Court and State Sovereignty

The historical issue of state sovereignty 7 and the formidable
impediment it presents 8 must be addressed before an ICC has an
opportunity of becoming a reality. In 1950 Georg Schwarzenberger
wrote that some nations were powerful enough to be immune from
collective enforcement measures 9 and offered the bleak assessment
that:
[A]n international criminal law that is meant to be applied
to the world powers is a contradiction in terms. It presupposes
an international authority which is superior to these States. In
reality, however, any attempt to enforce an international criminal code against either the Soviet Union or the United States
would be war under another name."
Over thirty years later, the prospects for an ICC were treated with
84.

M.

HUDSON,

supra note 3, at 186.

85. See Remarks by Sharon A. Williams, American Society of International Law, 80th
Annual Meeting, Washington, April 9 - April 12, 1986 (available in Proceedings of the 80th
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law at 125 (1986)) [hereinafter
80th Annual Meeting].
86. Dalfen, The World Court: Reform or Re-Appraisal, 1968, 1 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L
L. 212, 219.
87. Picciotto, Jurisdictional Conflicts. International Law and the International State
System, II INT'L J. Soc. & L. 11 (1983).
88. Delbrueck, International Protection of Human Rights and State Sovereignty, 57
IND. L.J. 567 (1982).
89. Schwarzenberger, The Problems of InternationalCriminal Law, 3 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS.

90.

263 (1950).
Id. at 295.
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equal pessimism by some writers. 91
In a press release issued in response to the Trinidad and Tobago
initiative for an ICC, the United States Mission to the United Nations speculated that the lack of progress in the establishment of an
international tribunal "raises the question of whether there is something inherent in the very concept of an ICC, and the derogation
from state sovereignty which it represents, that would prevent such a
court from receiving the broad acceptance which would be required
to make it effective." 9 2 If the concept of an ICC truly contains some
implicit element of a derogation from state sovereignty, it is instructive to examine three areas in which the conflict between an universal tribunal and state sovereignty is most pronounced: the subject
matter jurisdictional claims of a sovereign nation, its personal jurisdictional claims, and the rights of a criminal defendant who is tried
in the sovereign nation's domestic courts.
The term "jurisdiction" has many meanings.9 3 For the purposes
of this article, "subject matter jurisdiction" refers to the power to
hear cases of a certain class,9" and "personal jurisdiction" refers to
the power of a court over a defendant.9 5
The types of crimes which might fall under subject matter jurisdiction scope are diverse. Like the term "jurisdiction," the term "international crime" is not easily defined. One possible definition is
that any international crime must display at least one of the following elements: it must contain -either an international or a transnational element which is an offense to the world community,9 6 or it
must be so sweeping in scope that its activity affects the interest of
more than one nation.9 7
Early debate on defining an International Criminal Court's subject matter jurisdiction reflected no need for precision in defining an
international crime. Instead, the early debate questioned whether a
codified penal law was even necessary. 98 In contrast, the efforts of
Friedlander, Foundations of International Criminal Law: A Present Day Inquiry, 15
13 (1983).
92. Mission, supra note 81, at 2.
93. R. LEFLAR. AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 4 (3d ed. 1977). Professor Leflar's observation on the problem of defining jurisdiction is worth noting:
The word "jurisdiction" has too many meanings. Because of that, it is a
prime source of ambiguity in the law. About all that can be done about it, is to
try to be sure of the sense in which it is being used at any given time.
Id.
94. See, e.g., the definition of "subject matter jurisdiction," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1425 (6th ed. 1990).
95. See, e.g., the definition of "personal jurisdiction," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144
(6th ed. 1990).
96. Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law,
15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27 (1983) [hereinafter Characteristics].
97. Id.
98. During debate on the 1926 ILA Draft, the ILA's Permanent International Criminal
91.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
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the United Nations to establish an ICC have had a strong link to its
separate initiative of creating an international criminal code. On November 21, 1947, the General Assembly entrusted the ILC to formulate a draft code of offenses. 99 The ILC's special rapporteur, Jean
Spiropoulos, submitted a draft code' 00 and a revised draft code' 1 to
the ILC, which thereupon submitted a draft code of offenses to the
General Assembly, similar to Spiropoulos' revised draft.'0 2 The ILC
report listed thirteen international crimes, including acts or threats
of aggression by the authorities of one state against another state for
purposes of self defense; the undertaking or encouraging by state authorities of acts of civil strife and terrorism; the annexation of a state
by means contrary to international law; and acts in violation of the
customs and laws of war. 03 The draft code of offenses required a
precise definition of the term "aggression." Therefore, the General
Assembly decided that the special committee which had been assigned to prepare a detailed report on the definition of aggression,' 4
should submit its report before either the issue of a draft code of
offenses or the issue of an ICC would again be considered by the
General Assembly.' 0 6
In 1974 the General Assembly finally adopted a resolution defining aggression, 0 6 which appears to have been the apparent triggering event in the resurrection of United Nations reconsideration of
a draft code of offenses. On December 10, 1981, the General Assembly called for reconsideration of a draft code of offenses pursuant to
Resolution 36/106.107 From its 35th Session in 1983 through its
Court Committee considered whether there was any need for a criminal code for an ICC.
Though some people argued that a code would unduly limit an ICC's functions, the jurisdiction article, ultimately approved by the Committee, extended to international violations of a
penal character and to the laws and customs of war. 1926 ILA Draft, supra note I1, at 18082, 207-1I. Thirty-eight years later, the ILA conceded that its earlier attempt at drafting a
jurisdiction statute for an ICC was comprehensive yet quite general. 1984 ILA Draft, supra
note 48, at 279.
99. G.A. Res. 177 at 112, U.N. Doc. A/579 (1947.).
100. Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of
Jean Spiropolous, [1950] 2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/25 (1950).
101. Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of
Jean Spiropolous, [1951] 2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/44 (1951); Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of Jean Spiropolous,
[1954] 2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 112, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/85 (1954).
102. 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
103. Id. The draft consists of four articles and contains thirteen crimes.
104. G.A. Res. 895, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954).
105. G.A. Res. 897, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954).
106. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974). Article I of the resolution defining aggression states:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this
Definition.
Id.
107. G.A. Res. 36/106, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 239, U.N. Doc. 36/51
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43rd Session in 1991, the ILC has received nine reports from Special
Rapporteur Doudou Thiam and has provisionally accepted a number
of articles which identified crimes, including acts and threats of aggression, international terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, and colonial
domination.1"8
Some commentators feel that the recent United Nations work in
compiling a draft code of offenses is proceeding "fairly expeditiously."1 9 Others, however, view the United Nations efforts over
the past decade as an unfortunate regression from its efforts in the
1950s.110 For example, the Second and Third Reports of ILC Special
Rapporteur Doudou Thiam have been criticized for including offenses not included in any existing international agreement, such as
colonialism and mercenarism. 11 ' Perhaps the most acerbic charge is
that
the crimes are vaguely defined, ambiguous in their meaning and
the elements of each offense are far from being discernible. In
short, they violate the principles of legality required in criminal
codification. This is either a deliberate way to prevent the development of a technically sound code, or is the product of a very
high degree of technical nonchalance." 2
Despite such pessimistic assessments, the United nations continues to link draft code of offenses initiatives with parallel efforts on
behalf of an ICC."I In the ILC 1990 report, three separate options
(1982).
108. First report on the Draft Code of offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1983] 2 YB. INT'L L.COMM'N 137, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/364 (1983); Second report on
the Draft Code of offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1984] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 89, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/377 (1984); Third report on the Draft Code of offences
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1985] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 63, U.N. DOc.
A/CN.4/387 (1985); Fourth report on the Draft Code of offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1986] 2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 63, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (1986); Fifth
report on the Draft Code of offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1987] 2
Y.B. INT'L L.COMM'N I, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/404 (1987); Sixth report on the Draft Code of
offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1988] 2 YB INT'L L.COMM'N 55, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/411 (1988); Seventh report on the Draft Code of offences against the Peace
and Security of Mankind, [1989] 2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/419 and Add.
I (1990); Eighth report on the Draft Code of offences against the Peace .and Security of
Mankind, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/430 and Add. 1 (1990); Ninth report
on the Draft Code of offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/435 and Add. 1 (1991).
109. Mueller, Four Decades After Nuremberg: the Prospect of an International Criminal Code, 2 CONN. J.INT'L L. 499 (1987) [hereinafter Four Decades].
110. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 9.
I11. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 9.
112. See Remarks by Professor Bassiouni in 80th AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC., supra note
85, at 120.
113. In a Report addressing the Implementation, Codification, and Progressive Development of International Law for the five year period from 1992 to 1997, the General Assembly
indicated that continuing consideration for the creation of an ICC with jurisdiction over
"transnational criminal activities" would extend beyond 1992. U.N. Doc. A/45/6 (Prog. 9)
(1990). Following the U.N. solicitation of comments from member nations regarding a draft
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for subject matter jurisdiction were addressed: jurisdiction over
crimes based solely upon a code of offenses; jurisdiction over the
crimes in a draft code of offenses as well as other international
crimes not falling within that category; or a court established entirely independently of a draft code of offenses." 4
The debate over the scope of an ICC's personal jurisdiction has
been as vigorous as the debates on an ICC's subject matter jurisdiction. It is instructive, when reviewing United Nations efforts, to discuss draft articles conferring jurisdiction with draft articles recognizing jurisdiction. Under the 1953 ILC Draft, states would confer
jurisdiction on a court by convention, special agreement, or unilateral declaration. 15 Article 27 of the 1953 ILC Draft, which recognizes jurisdiction, is identical to the corresponding article in the 1951
ILC Draft, and it provides that no person shall be tried by an ICC
unless jurisdiction is conferred upon the court by the nation of which
the nation or nations where
that person is a national as well as1 1by
6
the crime allegedly was-committed.
During debate over the 1951 ILC Draft, discussion arose over
the possibility of prosecuting a defendant even if the nation having
jurisdiction over the defendant had not accepted the ICC's jurisdiction. There was some support for the argument that a nation, merely
by being party to the convention establishing an ICC, should be considered to have delegated its jurisdiction to the ICC. 7
The contrary and ultimately prevailing opinion was to proceed
cautiously, by requiring a nation to affirmatively confer jurisdiction
on a case-by-case basis, even if the nation were already party to the
convention.11 8 Two reasons were offered to support this position: first,
to assure that a large number of nations would adhere to the statute
establishing an ICC, and second, to assure the protection of the nation itself, in those instances in which prosecution of national leaders
might mandate review of that nation's foreign policy."1
A similar concern for state sovereignty was evident in the 1953
ILC Draft. 20 A motion to delete that portion of Article 27 which
mandated approval by the nation where the crime took place, was
rejected 1 ' and, as was the case with the 1951 ILC Draft, Article 27
was approved requiring the consent of both the nation of which the
code of offenses, numerous replies reflected
ICC. See U.N. Doc. A/45/437 (1990).
114. 1990 ILC Draft, supra note 42.
115. 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 36,
116. 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 36,
117. 1951 ILC Draft, supra note 35,
118. 1951 ILC Draft, supra note 35,
119. 1951 ILC Draft, supra note 35,
120. 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 36,
121. 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 36,

interest in the integration of such a code with an
art. 26, at 24.
art. 27, at 25.
commentary to
commentary to
commentary to
commentary to
commentary to

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

27,
27,
27,
27,
27,

para.
para.
para.
para.
para.

69, at 8.
70, at 9.
70, at 9.
97, at 14.
101, at 15.
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defendant was a national and the nation where the crime took place.
The 1990 ILC Report shows some movement away from the
jurisdictional scope of Article 27, as three separate options have been
outlined for jurisdictional competence: an ICC with exclusive jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction between an ICC and national courts,
and an ICC solely with review competence.12 2
An issue of particular concern relating to personal jurisdiction is
the question of what entities should come under an International
Criminal Court's power. In an early United Nations debate, the ILC
considered jurisdiction to apply to nations as well as to natural persons,12 but determined that this scope of jurisdiction was unacceptable because state responsibility for criminal actions was of a politi24
cal character and improper for an international court to address.
The 1953 ILC Draft provided for an ICC with competence to judge
"natural persons," whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals."' 25
The passage of over thirty years has not substantially changed
the United Nations' position on state responsibility. In 1984 the ILA
drafted a statute for an ICC which is similar to these United Nations initiatives, as it provides for jurisdiction solely over natural persons. 2 6 Furthermore, the 1990 ILC report indicates that the draft
being developed by the ILC is restricted to individuals and that extension of jurisdiction to nations was left for consideration at some
2 7
later stage.
Because the proposals for an ICC's subject matter and personal
jurisdiction have taken more than one path, the United Nations musf
attempt to choose those roads which would most likely lead to an
International Criminal Court. Regarding subject matter jurisdiction,
vigilance over the protracted efforts of the United Nations is essential. More recent United Nations initiatives, such as the 1990 ILC
Report which proposes the option of an ICC established independent
of UN efforts to create a code of offenses, may be a step in the right
direction.' 2 8 Despite the years of United Nations work on a draft
code of offenses, it is questionable whether this effort is the sine qua
non for an ICC, as it is believed to be by some commentators. In
1984, for example, the ILA drafted a statute for an ICC which
would not rely on a crimes code.' 9 Instead, its statute provided for
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

1990
1951
1951
1953
1984
1990
1990
1984

ILC
ILC
ILC
ILC
ILA
ILC
ILC
ILA

Draft,
Draft,
Draft,
Draft,
Draft,
Draft,
Draft,
Draft,

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

note
note
note
note
note
note
note
note

42.
35,
35,
36,
48,
42.
42.
48,

commentary to art. 25, at 4.
commentary to art. 25, at 4.
art. 25, at 24.
at 287.

appendix Al, art. 1, at 257.
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an ICC with jurisdiction over offenses "generally recognized under
international law" and listed twenty offenses as defined in corresponding conventions.130
130. These crimes are listed as follows:
(a)Genocide in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide of 9th December 1948 (Art. 11, III, IV); UNTS (United Nations
Treaty Series) Vol. 78, p. 277;
(b)Piracy on the High Seas in the Convention on the High Seas of 29th April
1958 (Art. 15, 16, 17); UNTS vol. 450, p. 11, 169;
(c)Offences and certain other acts committed on board aircraft in the Convention on Offences and certain other Acts committed on board Aircraft of 14th
September 1963 (Art. 1); UNTS Vol. 704, p. 219;
(d)Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft in the Convention for the Suppression of unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 16th December 1970 (Art. 1); International Legal
Materials, Vol. X, No. I, 1971, p. 133; I.C.A.O., Doc. 8920;
(e)Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation in the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 23rd September 1971 (Art. 1); International Legal Materials, Vol. X, No. 6, 1971, p.
1151; I.C.A.O., Doc. 8966;
(f)Offences defined in the four Red'Cross Conventions of 1949, UNTS Vol. 75.,
Nos. 970-973;
1. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12th August 1949
(Art. 50);
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea
of 12th August, 1949 (Art. 51);
3. Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
12th August 1949 (Art. 130);
4. Geneva Convention relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War of 12th August 1949 (Art. 147);
(g)Slave Trade in
1. Slavery Convention of 25 September 1926 and amended by the Protocol of 7th December 1953 (Art. 1); LNTS (League of Nations Treaty
Series) Vol. 60, p. 253; UNTS Vol. 182, p.51; Vol. 212, p. 17;
2. Supplementary Convention of 7th September 1956 (Art. 3, para. 1, 6);
UNTS Vol. 265, p. 3;
(h)Traffic in women and children
1. In the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave
Traffic of 4th May 1910 as amended by the Protocol of 4th May 1949
(Art. 1, 2); UNTS Vol. 98, p. 101; 53, p.29;
2. in the Convention for the Suppression for the Traffic of Women and
Children of 30th September 1921 as amended by the Protocol of 12th
November 1947 (Art. 3); UNTS Vol. 53, p.13;
(i)Offences related to narcotic drugs in the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of 30th March 1961 (Art. 36, para. 1, 2, (a), (i), (ii)); UNTS Vol. 520,
p.151;
(O)Offences defined in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 21st February 1971 (Art. 22 para. 1, 2 (a), (i), (ii)); U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 58, 19th February
1971;
(k)Currency Counterfeiting in the International Convention for the Suppression
of Counterfeiting Currency of 20th April 1929 (Art. 3, 4); LNTS Vol. 112,
p.371;
(l)Offences defined in the Final Act and Convention of the International
Overfishing Conference of 5th April 1946 (Art. 5, 6, 7, 8); UNTS Vol. 231,
p.199; Vol. 431, p.304; Vol. 456, p.496; Vol. 482, p.372;
(m)Offences defined in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil of 12th May 1954 (Art. Ill, IV, V); UNTS Vol. 327, p.3;
Vol. 600, p.332;
(n)Damage to submarine cables in the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables of 14th March 1884 (Art. 2); II Martens Nouveau Recueil (2d)
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In the absence of a court with international criminal jurisdiction
such as an ICC, nations rely on an indirect enforcement system,''
based upon the assumption that each signatory nation enforces its
provisions under its national criminal laws.1 32 The ILA model could
be followed by selecting some of the twenty offenses cited by the
ILA that have been the subject of international conventions, and by
using them to serve as the substantive criminal offenses for an ICC.
The ILA proposal on this issue may be in order during an era when
the United Nations is sometimes exhorted to reassess the direction of
its work on the draft code of offenses since such work is considered
1 33
to be enmeshed at "a level of broad generalities.
No instance of the contrast between the ILA's expediency and
the United nations tentativeness is more evident than in their respective treatment of the term "aggression." The ILA acknowledges that
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution defining aggression is "too general from the point of view of international criminal
law' 3 and "utterly unsuitable" for application by an international
criminal court."' 35 However, under the ILA model, the ICC's jurisdiction is defined solely by valid international conventions. 3 The
definition of aggression, thought by some legal scholars to be the
"primordial international crime' 3 37 and the cornerstone of the
United Nations efforts in drafting a code of offenses, 3 8 was not nec9
essary in the disposition of the ILA Draft."1
The ILA's observation that past efforts at establishing an ICC
p.281;
(o)Crimes defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime against Internationally Protected Persons of 14th December 1973 (arts. 2,
3); U.N. Doc. 3166 (XXVIII).
(p)Crimes defined in the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid of 30th November 1973 (Art. 1); U.N. Doc. 3068
(XXVIII);
(q)Crimes defined in the Convention against the Taking of Hostages of 18th
December 1979 (Art. I, 2); U.N. Doc. A/34/819 (XXXIV);
(r)Crimes defined in the Universal Postal Convention of 26th October 1979
(Art. 13 (e));
(s)Offences defined in the Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property of
Nov. 14, 1970 (Arts. 6, 7, 8), No. 10 Int'l Legal Materials 1971 p.289-293;
(t)Offences defined in the Convention on Int'l Trade in endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora of 3 March 1973 (Arts. V, VI, VII & VIII), (cmend.
5459).
See 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 48, art. 1,at 257.
131. Characteristics.supra note 96, at 29.
132. Characteristics,supra note 96, at 29.
133. Statement of Sir John Freeland, 1984 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 576.
134. See 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 48, arts. 27, 31, at 288-89.
135. See id.
136. See 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 48, art. 1,at 257.
137. See Remarks of Stephen C. McCaffrey in Annual Meeting, supra note 85, at 121.
138. Id.
139. See 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 48, arts. 27, 31, at 288-89.
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gave too large a consideration to political offenses, which played a
major role in defining aggression, raises the added issue of the practicality of establishing an ICC with a sweeping subject matter jurisdiction. In its 1990 report to the House of Delegates, the Section of
International Law and Practice of the American Bar Association
(ABA) recommended the establishment of an ICC with jurisdiction
solely over international drug trafficking.1 0 While acknowledging
that its recommendation was modest, the ABA noted that:
Many of the crimes specified in the draft statutes on an
international criminal court, such as the crime against peace,
raise the prospect of the trial of international leaders before an
international tribunal along the lines of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. However desirable this might be in theory it is simply
unrealistic as a practical matter. Unlike World War II most
armed conflicts do not result in the total defeat and the unconditional surrender of adversaries - the conditions that permitted
the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials to be held.' 4'
The ABA's modest approach to limiting the crimes to be considered by an ICC may be the most realistic approach possible. Amidst
earnest calls for Nuremberg-like war crimes trials during war and its
immediate aftermath,"4 2 it is important to recall that international
tribunals, such as those in Nuremberg and Tokyo, were sometimes
categorized as forums in which the "victors have availed themselves
of their powers as victors to judge."' 43 This argument cast the victors
as being as culpable as their vanquished opponents in certain instances, but having the power of their victory to immunize them
from prosecution." 4
140. American Bar Association on International Law and Practice, Report to the House
of Delegates (1990) [hereinafter ABA Report]. See also an earlier American Bar Association
proposal for a limited jurisdiction for an International Criminal Court (ICC), leaving open the
possibility of a future jurisdictional expansion following an ICC's initial successes. Hoffman,
Jurisdiction of an ICC, I I INT'L LAW, 377 (1977).
141. See American Bar Association on International Law and Practice, Report to the
House of Delegates (1990) [hereinafter ABA Report].
142. Robbins, Iraqi War Criminals Face Hanging, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1991, at A12,
col. 3.
143. Borchard, InternationalLaw and InternationalOrganizations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
106, 107 (1947). See also MINEAR, supra note 25.
144. Some thought it was ironic that only Nazi defendants were charged with crimes
against peace through waging aggressive war, in the face of earlier silence, if not outright
complicity, by some of the Allies following the annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and
during the Nazi invasion of Poland. See Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and InternationalLaw,
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 26-28 (1947). See also George F. Kennan's discussion of the Nuremberg trials, wherein Kennan noted his distress with a proceeding whereby a Russian judge,
representing a bloody Stalinist regime, could be permitted to preside:
The only implication that this procedure could convey was after all, that
such crimes were justifiable and forgivable when committed by the leaders of
one government, under one set of circumstances, but unjustifiable and unforgivable, and to be punishable by death, when committed by another set of government leaders, under another set of circumstances. It was difficult to arrive at any
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It is significant to consider whether war crimes trials could
damage the credibility of a permanent ICC, especially if the calls for
war crimes trials may sometimes be perceived as mere rhetoric by
world leaders,"' which fades upon the cessation of hostilities.14 6 It
would also be necessary to determine the degree to which calls for
war crimes trials are diluted by either a nation's desire to avoid the
antagonism of a newly formed hospitable administration established
in the recently vanquished nation,14 7 or simply a reluctance to pursue
such an endeavor at the end of a war. 14 8 Moreover, it is important to
recall the apprehensions of those who have questioned the fragile
balance between legalistic solutions and foreign policy objectives.14 9
A permanent ICC with jurisdiction over war crimes may be successul in the prosecution of defendants charged with such crimes,
despite the belief by some proponents, such as the ABA International Law Committee, that the success of an ICC is predicted upon
a more minimalist approach. What price to its reputation, however,
would an ICC pay if provided such extensive jurisdiction, especially
at its inception? One might question, for example, the cost to its
credibility if the ICC were faced the proposition that if an American
officer were convicted of a war crime, the President of the United
States, along with his Secretaries of Defense and State, should appear before the same tribunal. The question receives an added urgency if the proposition were advanced, as it once was, by someone
such as the former chief United States prosecutor at the Nuremberg
trials.1 50
The modest scope of an ICC's subject matter jurisdiction is apother interpretation.
(1925-1950) 274 (1969).
145. When asked if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein should be tried and hanged for war
crimes, President George Bush indicated that if he were approached "as a broker," he might
be willing to allow Hussein to leave Iraq with the promise never to return, as a condition to
avoid prosecution. Transcript of President Bush's News Conference, Wash. Post, Apr. 17,
1991 at A26, col. 1.
146. Kamen & Devroy, Saddam's Power.Seen Increasing, Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1991 at
AI, col. I.
147. BoscH. JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG 34 (1970).
148. Id. at 112.
149. G. KENNAN. AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 100 (expanded ed. 1984). George F. Kennan's
observation over forty years ago might appear particularly prescient today among some foreign
policy decision makers:
Even under a system of world law the sanction against destructive international behavior might continue to rest basically, as it has in the past, on the
alliances and relationships among the great powers themselves. There might be a
state, or perhaps more than one state, which all the rest of the world community
together could not successfully coerce into following a line of action to which it
was violently averse. And if this is true, where are we? It seems to me that we
are right back in the realm of the forgotten act of diplomacy, from which we
have spent fifty years trying to escape.
Id.
150. Sheehan, Taylor Says by Yamashita Ruling Westmoreland May Be Guilty, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 9, 1971, at 3, col. 1.
KENNAN. MEMOIRS
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propriate for an ICC's personal jurisdiction, by providing concurrent
jurisdiction over defendants. The ABA has recently observed that
the concurrent jurisdiction available in Article 27 of the 1953 ILC
Draft would be an "indispensable component" of an ICC, especially
since it would provide an effective compromise for those critics who
consider that the creation of an ICC would adversely affect state
sovereignty.15 ' The current Trinidad and Tobago initiative also supports the principle of concurrent jurisdiction.' 52
While concurrent jurisdiction for an ICC has not received unanimous approval, 5 3 it remains a most realistic option. It would be
completely consistent with the proposal for an ICC's subject matter
jurisdiction by assuring potential Member States that their state sovereignty would not be impugned, and they would have control over
the fate of their nationals.
Personal jurisdiction should, moreover, be limited to natural
persons. Attempts to define personal jurisdiction narrowly have met
with some criticism. The United Nations proposals that have excluded nations from criminal responsibility, have been viewed as inconsistent with the international legal doctrine that was established
since the late 1800s, 54 as well as with the ILC's separate efforts in
preparing Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 55 Despite this criticism, there is merit in the countervailing belief that "the concept of
international state responsibility is not yet firmly established in international law' 5 and that efforts of the United Nations to codify
state responsibility 57 have been more indicative of interest in developing the concept of state responsibility than in actually codifying
58
state responsibility.
Sovereignty has, in a most pessimistic appraisal, been categorized as a "cult . . . characteristic of the tendency of political and
legal thought to be parasitic upon things as they have been rather
than perceptive of things as they are or purposeful of things as they
might be."' 59 In 1966 Raymond Aron wrote that an abandonment of
the "state's right of determining justice without appeal" was contin151. See ABA Report, supra note 140, at 4, 5.
152. See Thorpe, supra note 57, at 6.
153. It.has, for example, been argued that the competence of an ICC should supersede
national criminal courts. It has also been argued that allowing nations whose citizens are criminal defendants, or nations where the alleged crime occurred, to confer jurisdiction on an ICC
would result in many crimes not coming before an ICC because of the reluctance of these
nations to confer jurisdiction in many instances. See Wright, supra note 73, at 69.
154. See BASSlOUNI, supra note 2, at 6.
155. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 6. See also Apartheid Draft, supra note 46, art.
24(4)(a).
156. C. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (1987).
157. See Summary Records of the 1361st-1376th Meetings, [1976] I Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 7-91, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.19/1976.
158. See C. GRAY, supra note 156, at 217.
159. C. JENKS. LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 32 (1967).
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gent upon three elements being present in the world: a consciousness
of community, an acceptance of a juridical and political regime, and
a -monopoly of armed force. 60 If one were to accept Aron's proposition, the three conditions necessary for nations to relinquish this
right are far from being realized. Therefore, it may be prudent to
envision an International Criminal Court with a narrow focus on the
type of crimes under its jurisdiction as well as on its personal jurisdiction. If an ICC-with a modest mission is deemed credible, an expansion of jurisdiction would be more likely than if an ICC started
out with an expansive jurisdiction and, therefore, lacked credibility.
If the success of an ICC is, to some degree, contingent upon the
participation of world powers, it is important to consider how the
United States would respond to the criminal rights and procedures
that would be afforded an accused in a trial in such a forum.
Debate on this issue arose after the ILC 1953 Draft was proposed. John J. Parker, who in 1951 was Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, found that the procedure set forth in the ILC 1953 Draft, would be fair to any defendant under an ICC's jurisdiction. Judge Parker also noted that the
vital principles of the Bill of Rights, including the rights to due process, a public trial, and effective assistance of legal counsel were contained in the ILC 1951 Draft. 6 ' Anticipating the argument that the
ILC 1951 Draft presented unresolvable conflicts with the United
States Constitution, Judge Parker asserted that "there is nothing in
the Constitution which limits the power of the United States to join
other nations in setting up a court to try those who have committed
16 2
crimes against the law of nations.1
Others were not as sure of compatibility between United Nations drafts and the United States Constitution. For example, the
1951 ILC Draft also gave rise to the argument that removal of offenses committed in the United States to an ICC pursuant to United
States participation in a treaty authorizing such a removal would 6be3
ultra vires of Federal power under Article III of the Constitution.
Additionally, there was a strong belief that basic Constitutional
rights guaranteed to an accused, such as the right to a trial by jury,,
could not be ignored if an accused were submitted to an ICC, at
least for those offenses committed within the territory of the United
States."6
160.
161.
A.BA. J.
162.
163.
A.B.A. J.
164.

R. ARON, PEACE AND WAR 753 (1966).
See Parker, An International Criminal Court: The Case for Its Adoption, 38
641 (1952). See also 1951 ILC Draft, supra note 35, arts. 35-53.
Id. at 647.
Finch, An International Criminal Court: The Case Against Its Adoption, 38
644 (1952).
See Parker, supra note 161, at 648.
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Controversy over this issue was not confined to the United Nations efforts during the 1950s. Since the Genocide Convention provides for the prosecution of genocide under any international tribunal that may come into existence, 65 debates over the interaction of
this provision with the Constitution are relevant to proposals for international tribunals having a broader criminal jurisdiction, such as
an ICC. When the United States first debated ratification of the Genocide. Convention, the ABA's Special Committee on Peace and Law
Through the United Nations expressed the concern that American
citizens might be subjected to "an international tribunal where they
would not be surrounded by the constitutional safeguards and legal
rights accorded persons charged with a domestic crime."' 6 6 Judge
Orie Phillips, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the 10th Circuit in 1949, expressed apprehension over citizens of the
United States, charged with genocide, falling under the jurisdiction
of an ICC. Therefore, he proposed that an alternate focus on enacting domestic legislation and using domestic courts, would avoid potential Constitutional pitfalls.' 67
Almost forty years after Judge Phillips' observations, these apprehensions have not abated. On the eve of the United States Senate's ratification of the Genocide Convention, the Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations contained a provision that the
United States participate in an international penal tribunal only with
the advice and consent of the Senate.' 6 8 The Committee, moreover,
expressed extreme skepticism over efforts to establish any ICC, while
noting serious constitutional objections, the novelty of the concept,
165. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. 6.
166. Report of the Special Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, 74
REP. A.B.A.J. 317 (1949).
167. Phillips, The Genocide Convention: Its Effect on Our Legal System, 35 A.B.A. J.
623. 625 (1949). Judge Phillips stated that:
If genocide and kindred offenses defined in the treaty are in fact international crimes, would not the wise course be to enact domestic legislation under
Section 8, Clause 10, Article I of the Constitution of the United States, defining
such offenses, and providing for the trial and punishment of persons committing
such offenses, in our domestic courts, where the accused will be guaranteed his
constitutional rights and accorded due process under our concept of that phrase?
We would thus set our own house in order, offer the same protection to the
accused as one charged with any domestic crime, and reserve to our own courts
the final determination of questions as to the interpretation of the penal statute.
To agree, by international convention, to so define, try, and punish persons who
commit the offenses which the treaty undertakes to define, would seem to me to
wholly fulfill our international obligation, and would avoid many serious questions with respect to the incipient effects of ratification of the Convention on our
constitutional and legal system and questions of policy which will arise on a
consideration of concurrence by the Senate in the proposed Convention.
Id.
168. S. REP. No. 99-2, 99th Cong., I st Sess. 25 (1985).
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and numerous legal and policy issues to be faced.169 Senator Jesse
Helms of North Carolina, voting against ratification of the Genocide
Convention, stated that he did not "want to see the U.S. submit itself to an international regime of law or is enforced by a group of
nations which do not have our legislative history and goals, and perhaps no understanding of those principles of our nation."' 70 In light
of the Senate's view of the international penal article contained in
the Genocide Convention, it is not unreasonable to assume that any
independent consideration of an ICC would be viewed with similar
skepticism.
This apprehension has been considered by some writers to be
groundless, on the basis of past United States participation in international tribunals, ranging from international arbitration tribunals
and international war crimes courts to the ICJ.' 7' It has also been
asserted that the laws of the United States must apply to offenses
committed in the United States, and that United States courts must
sit in judgment of such offenses. However, it has been noted that this
proposition has been riddled with exceptions. Foreign consuls have
enforced foreign criminal law over their fellow nationals, and the
National Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agree-:
ment 7 z has long permitted Allied soldiers and their dependents to be
tried by Allied military courts, even when such offenses were triable
in United States Courts."'
The argument has been made that "the Supreme Court could
• . . hold constitutional our participation in an international court
whose charter and procedure incorporated the substantial elements
of fairness which those institutions were designed to secure.' 7" That
element of fairness has, moreover, been considered in concert with
"development of a scheme of ordered liberty.' 75 In his book, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, Professor Louis Henkin argued
that the United States Constitution contains nothing to preclude participation in an ICC, though he observed that some element of fundamental fairness would be required of an ICC. 76 For example, a
problem would arise if an ICC so deprived citizens of their funda169. Id. at 25, 26.
170. Toner, After 37 Years, Senate Endorses a Genocide Ban, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20,
1986 at Al, col. 1.
171. McDougal & Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 683 (1950) [hereinafter McDougal].
172. North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement, June 18, 1951, Act AVII
[1953], 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
173. L. HENKIN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
174. See McDougal, supra note 171, at 695.
175. See Klein & Wilkes, United Nations Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court: An American Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 578 (G. Mueller & E.
Wise eds. 1965) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW].
176. See L. HENKIN, supra note 173, at 200.
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mental civil rights and liberties.17
If one were to accept the premise that an ICC's code of criminal procedure had to reflect a concept of fundamental fairness as a
pre-condition to United States participation, it is essential to note
that attempts to incorporate these elements into various ICC drafts,
while similar, are no means identical to the text of the United States
Constitution. Such a variance could be problematic.' 78
Efforts at harmonizing ICC drafts with the Constitution may be
sincere attempts at assuring an.ICC's approval by American jurists
and politicians. Nonetheless, whatever form of criminal procedure
would ultimately be adopted by an ICC, the chances that the forms
of criminal procedure would be a duplication of the United States
Constitution are remote. One observation made in the context of
human rights initiatives is appropriate to this issue: "The notion that
the United States would require no change in the way we do things
seems -

to put it mildly -

anomalous. The principal purpose of

undertaking obligations is to promise to do what one is not yet
doing."'
It is critical to dissuade apprehension over a possible divergence
from the exact letter of the United States Constitution, lest it be an
insurmountable impediment in efforts to create an ICC. This problem was noticed as early as the 1950s, when it was observed that
were it necessary to await unanimity among United States lawyers
for an appropriate judicial mechanism, "we [would] indeed wait forever."' 8 ° In 1965 Gerhard Mueller noted that American objections
to an international code of criminal justice rested, in part, on a
177. See L. HENKIN, supra note 173, at 201.
178. Several examples are illustrative of attempts to harmonize the United States Constitution with ICC drafts. The 1953 ILC Draft provides that ICC trials would be held without
jury "except where otherwise provided in the instrument by which jurisdiction has been conferred upon the court." 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 36, art. 37 at 25. This provision was
apparently included at the request of the United States and other nations whose own constitutional provisions were considered impediments to the adoption of this draft without such a
provision, 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 36, commentary to art. 37 at 14, though some commentators felt that the concept of a jury trial in an international forum would nullify the principles
underlying the concept of an ICC. Parker, supra note 161, at 243. See also INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW,

supra note 175, at 561.

The 1953 ILC Draft further provided an ICC with the discretion to determine "whether
an accused shall remain at custody during the trial or be personally set at liberty and the
condition under which such provisional liberty shall be granted." 1953 ILC Draft, supra note
36, art. 41 at 26. This provision prompted some writers to note the absence of language consistent with the Eighth Amendment. See International Criminal Law, supra note 175, at 565.
While it was acknowledged that even in the United States courts the right to bail was not
absolute, a suggestion was offered to harmonize this provision with the Eighth Amendment by
adding the phrase "but excessive bail shall not be required." See International Criminal Law,
supra note 175, at 565.
179. Henkin, International Human Rights in the United States, in I HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (T. Meron ed. 1984).
180. See Parker, supra note 161, at 643.
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purely emotional basis. 18 1 Twenty-two years later, he wrote that his
earlier assessment of American objections was still justified, and that
this emotional barrier was based on the belief of some United States'
lawyers that, by entering into an international legal system, the
United States would sacrifice the benefits of its presumably superior
common law system on behalf of the supposedly. weaker continental
regime of their brethren across the Atlantic.18 2
It has been asserted that the Framers of the United States Constitution, while never specifically contemplating allowing the United
States to enter an ICC, did not contemplate preventing our entry
into international forums. 8 ' It has also been observed that the formidable constitutional issues facing the United States entry into an
ICC would be in uncharted, though not necessarily through unnavigable waters.18 4 Any eventual entry by the United States into an
ICC may be difficult without some concession on the issue of the
rights afforded an accused.
The outlook may not be so bleak if the United States Constitution is viewed not as an impediment, but rather as a catalyst. For
example, the rights afforded an accused appearing before an International Criminal Court could be the product of a synthesis between
the Constitution and a variety of international agreements. This proposition is based upon two factors: the influence of the Constitution
on nations worldwide,"8 5 and the transformation of human rights law
from a national to an international concern over the past fifty
years,"' as is evidenced in numerous international agreements, such
as the United Nations Charter,187 the Universal Declaration of
and the International Covenant of Human
Human Rights,'
Rights.'
This combination might assuage political worries, while
providing a framework for an effective guarantee for criminal defendants. To be sure, such an effort may require a reassessment of
the United States' resolve to take a major role in such an effort.
181.

Mueller, The United Nations Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Secur-

it), of Mankind: An American Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 605 (G. Muel-

let & E. Wise eds. 1965).
182. See Four Decades, supra note 109, at 504.
183. L HENKIN, supra note 173, at 198.
184. See L HENKIN, supra note 173, at 199.
185. Blaustein, The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad, 12 OKLA. CITY
U. L REV. 435 (1987).
186. Prounis, The Human Rights Committee: Toward Resolving the Paradox of
Human Rights Law, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 103 (1985).
187. Signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, and entered into force October 24,
1945.
188. G.A. Res. 216 at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Adopted by the General Assembly
on December 10, 1948.
189. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 52. U.N. Doc. A/6316; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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If such a synthesis is deemed unworkable, however, other options for implementation of an ICC's criminal procedure are available. First, an ICC may adopt the existing criminal procedure of the
nations which confer jurisdiction in any given case. Second, separate
codes of criminal procedure could be drafted which would represent
major legal systems, such as the Common Law, Code Civil, Socialist, Islamic, Far East, or Black African traditions.19 The nations
conferring jurisdiction for a specific case could be afforded, under
such a plan, some measure of flexibility which could be useful for
criminal cases having a particularly regional focus.
These proposals need not be mutually exclusive. A combination
of the proposals may be made available, depending on the circumstances of a particular case. The incorporation of criminal procedure
into a nascent ICC need not be as daunting as the detractors of an
ICC may contend. The transplanting of a legal system from one nation, or people, to another has been viewed as a procedure which
may be made without much difficulty and can be well received by
the ultimate recipients of the transplant.' 9 1 What appears to be most
important is neither the simplicity nor the sophistication of the legal
system in place, but rather the social acceptance of a reliable rule of
192
law.
V.

The Basic Organization of an International Criminal Court

The issues relating to the basic organizational structure of an
ICC are no less problematic than those related to the more fundamental questions already discussed. From the investigation of an alleged crime under an ICC jurisdiction to the incarceration of a defendant, the path may indeed be tortuous. An International Criminal
Court would require more than mere panels of judges hearing a case.
That stage is but one instance in the middle of an entire process of
investigation, arrest, trial, sentencing, and imprisonment. Amid the
various ICC drafts in existence, neither simplicity nor complexity of
an ICC's organizational makeup is as significant as the necessity to
structure such an organization as an inducement for nations to believe that it is in their best interest to confer jurisdiction on an efficient and equitable ICC. Factors relevant to a nation's motivation to
confer jurisdiction upon an ICC are the following: possible association with the ICJ, qualifications of an ICC's judges, the bureaucracy
of the ICC, and its cooperation with Member States.
190. See generally R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY. MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD
(1985). For another analysis of global cultural and political traditions which could
provide a framework for this proposal. See F.S.C. NORTHRUP. THE TAMING OF NATIONS
(1952).
191. A. WATSON. LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 95, 96 (1973).
192. Id.
TODAY
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One issue discussed during the United Nations' early work on
an ICC was whether such a court should be a criminal chamber created within the ICJ.' 9 3 In 1950 Sebastian Pella wrote that the possibility of creating a criminal chamber for this purpose would be consistent with the identity of civil and criminal courts." 4 Pella
determined, however, that because the creation of a criminal chamber of the ICJ required revision of the ICJ's statute, a more effective
means for the creation of an ICC would be establishing an organ
separate from the ICJ. 95 This proposal has been considered with approval by other writers.196
To create a criminal chamber within the International Court of
Justice would require the employment of the same procedures provided in the Charter of the United Nations for the amendment of
that Charter.1 97 The United Nations procedure, under Article 108 of
the United Nations Charter, requires adoption by two-thirds of the
General Assembly, including all permanent Members of the Security
Council. 98 Pursuant to Article 70 of the ICJ statute, the initiative
for changing the statute may arise from the Member States of the
United Nations, or from the ICJ itself.'99 If the ICJ were to exercise
its power to propose the creation of an ICC, such an initiative would
not be unprecedented.2 0 0
The question remains whether such an initiative is advisable
even if the ICJ, or Member States, would be inclined to take the
necessary statutory measures. The ICJ, without an international
criminal chamber, has been the subject of harsh criticism by some
American conservatives, as reflected in the assessment that the ICJ
"blows with the political breezes, some of them noxious to the
U.S." '0 1 Such an observation may be dismissed by some as political
rhetoric. Such a statement, however, when coupled with the longstanding perception that the ICJ has played an insignificant role in
international dispute resolution, 02 and the inescapable reality that
193.
194.
195.
196.

Pella, Towards an InternationalCriminal Court, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 37, 59 (1950).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 59.
Wood, Judges and Structure of an International Criminal Court, in TOWARD A
FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL COURT 291 (J. Stone & R. Woetzel, eds. 1970).
197. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 69, in DOCUMENTS ON
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

at 60-89 (S. Rosenne ed., 2nd ed. 1979) [hereinafter

STATUTE OF THE COURT].

198. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, art. 108.
199. STATUTE OF THE COURT, supra note 197, art. 70.
200. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has, for example, proposed amending the
statute, which provides that the seat of its Court shall be at the Hague. See Qadeer, The
International Court of Justice: A Proposalto Amend its Statute, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 35, 52
n.88 (1982).
201. Krauthammer, The Curse of Legalism: International Law? It's Purely Advisory,
THE NEw REPUBLIC,

202.

Nov. 6, 1989, at 44.

Comment, The InternationalCourt of Justice: Is It Time for a Change?, 8 HOUS.
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the ICJ has averaged less than one contentious case per year in the
first thirty-five years of its existence,20 3 is not as readily dismissable.
If the -ICJ has been criticized for its performance under its current
jurisdictional mandate, one can scarcely anticipate that similar criticism would be absent if an individual were to appear before that
same tribunal for criminal proceedings.
Certainly, some of the problems attributed to the International
Court of Justice, such as excessive delay in rendering a decision,
may be somewhat exaggerated." 4 The ICJ's reputation, moreover,
may have improved in recent years. 2 5 Nonetheless, the effort remains for the ICJ to dispose of the numerous adverse perceptions,
justified or not, which have evolved since its inception. To do so requires an effort to make it more attractive to those Member States
that ultimately choose to submit to its jurisdiction. 0 6 It is questionable whether the addition of a criminal chamber to the ICJ would be
more of a hindrance than a benefit, both to the ICJ and to a newly
created ICC. Sebastian Pella's suggestion in 1950 may be an attractive alternative. It may be far more prudent to proceed with a separately established International Criminal Court than to have it saddled with the ICJ's reputation before it has even heard its first case.
The questions relating to the nomination, selection, and qualifications of judges for an ICC have been treated in numerous ICC
drafts.20 7 Focus herein is not on the procedural aspects of the selection of judges found in these proposals. Instead, several suggestions
are advanced assuring diversity, competence, and efficiency, regardless of what framework is ultimately established for the selection of
the judges.
The 1953 ILC Draft recognized the necessity for creating a
broad-based representative composition of an ICC when it indicated
that its judiciary, to the extent possible, should "represent the main
forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world. 2' 08
This provision, incorporated into the 1984 ILA Draft,20 9 merits serious consideration. To the extent practicable, a "catholicity of representation" 2 10 should be infused into the provisions of an ICC statute
J. INT'L L 175 (1985) (authored by Keith Weir).
203. Daly, Is the International Court of Justice Worth the Effort?, 20 AKRON L. REV.
391 (1987).
204. Gross, The Time Element in the Contentious Proceedings in the International
Court of Justice, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 74, 78 (1969).
205. Shapiro, Oft-Maligned World Court Poisedfor Comeback, Legal Times, Feb. 5,
1990, at 6.
206. See Dalfen, supra note 86, at 220.
207. See Havana Draft, supra note 45, art. 23, at 37; Apartheid Draft, supra note 46,
art. 14 at 553; 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 48, arts. 3-18, at 285-87.
208. 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 36, art. 10, at 23.
209. See 1984 ILA DRAFT, supra note 48, arts. 27, 31, at 288-89.
210. See T. HOLTON, AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE COURT (1970).
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addressing judicial selection. Perhaps the statutes of the ICJ which
embody judicial diversity may serve as a model.21 1 Attempts to select
judges outside of the nations which would be parties to an ICC convention is another possibility.2 1 2 Whatever steps are taken, they
should be pursued in the spirit of allowing nations to feel that ICC
judges, though part of an international tribunal, maintain a representational character through their diversity, which would deflect the
fears of alienation.
Regarding qualifications, ICC judges have been envisioned as
jurists of "international repute ' 2 14 or as "experts in the fields of international criminal law or human rights. '21 Frequently, these qualifications have been integrated into a requirement that prospective
judges be qualified to serve on the highest courts of their respective
nations.2"' Such proposals are similar to the requirements of the ICJ
statute for judges "to possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial office, or
[to be] juriconsults of recognized competence in international
law. 21 7
Proponents of an ICC should be wary of using the ICJ statute
as an exclusive model for ICC judges. It has been argued that the
ICJ has sometimes included jurists with no reputation in international law, and whose training as international jurists began only after their appointments.21 8 It has been further argued that some ICJ
justices, though law students or practitioners interested in international law early in their careers, did not concentrate on international
law thereafter.2" 9
This situation should be avoided with International Criminal
Court judges. It is reasonable to assume that ICC judges would face,
along with the natural challenges from sitting on an international
bench, the added element of publicity and scrutiny from the media,
especially involving defendants of international notoriety. Given such
a possible circumstance, it may be useful to add a separate requirement to the current proposals. Specifically, candidates should be experienced in criminal practice before their national courts. Several
211. STATUTE OF THE COURT, supra note 197, arts. 2, 3.
212. See generally Editorial Comments, EC-EFTA Court? 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
343 (1989) (Proposal that judges for a merged EC-EFTA Court need not be nationals of

nation members of the EEC).
213.
214.

See generally A. LARSON, WHEN NATIONS DISAGREE (1961).
See 1984 ILA DRAFT, supra note 48, arts. 27, 31, at 288-89.

215.

Havana Draft, supra note 45, art. 23, at 37.

216. Havana Draft, supra note 45, art. 23, at 37; Apartheid Draft, supra note 46, art.
14(2) at 553.
217. STATUTE OF THE COURT, supra note 197, at art. 2.
218.

(1979).
219.

L. PROTT. THE LATENT POWER OF CULTURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE 67

Id. at 27.
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such requirements might be delineated, such as experience as a public prosecutor, a specific number of cases tried either as prosecutor or
defense counsel, or experience as a trial or appellate judge with a
considerable criminal docket. 220 When Senator Alfonse D'Amato of
New York endorsed federal prosecutors for appointments to the
United States federal Bench, he emphasized the importance of appointing "people who are steeped in the practicalities of the criminal
justice system."2 2 ' Such a criterion may have equal applicability for
the selection of ICC judges.
One of an ICC's more attractive features could be the diversity
of its bench, reflecting the experience and varying perspectives of
judges from across the world. Inherent in that diversity are the contrasts in legal training and experience, which could engender confusion. It may, therefore, be appropriate to provide ICC with a panel
of assessors, or counsel, who are experts in international criminal
law, to provide assistance on the thorny international legal issues
that the judges would confront. The idea was discussed, but rejected,
during debate of the 1926 ILA Draft.22 2 Several arguments were
made in its opposition. First, some felt discomfort at the concept of
"judges who are not judges, 22 3 or de facto judges with no official
power of adjudication. Second, the combination of assessors and
judges was considered too cumbersome and confusing an arrangement. 2 4 Third, there was apprehension over the perceived difficulty
in finding qualified assessors who had interest in the positions. 225
Such apprehensions should not deter the resurrection of this
idea. During debate on the 1926 ILA Draft, an example was offered
of the positive role of assessors in British maritime law. These assessors, generally used when an issue of technical skill or experience
arose, advised the judge on such "questions of a nautical character, '221 though the judge alone was responsible for the final decision. 227 The disadvantages of using assessors would be outweighed by
their value. While some have considered assessors contributing to the
confusion of ICC judges, it is far more likely that their contribution
would enable the judges of an ICC to be a more competent and enlightened body.228

I.

220.
221.

See O'Byrne, Finding the Best for the Bench, JUDGES J., Winter 1988, at 30.
Squiers, D'Amato Backs Drug Prosecutors as Judges, N.Y. L. J. Nov. 21, 1990, at

1926 ILA Draft, supra note I1, at 188-92.
1926 ILA Draft, supra note 11, at 189.
1926 ILA Draft, supra note 11, at 191.
1926 ILA Draft, supra note 11, at 189.
R. WILLIAMS, A TREATISE ON THE JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE ENGLISH
COURTS IN ADMIRALTY AND APPEALS 442 (3rd ed. 1986).
227. Id.
228. It is also noted that the Statute for the ICJ provides for assessors, Stat. I.C.J. art.
30, para. 2, though this provision has not been applied. See 1988-1989 Y.B. INT'L CT, JUST. 15.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
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Past attempts at forming an International Criminal Court organizational structure follow a general pattern. The 1953 ILC Draft,
for example, provides for a Committing Chamber which would consist of judges who would not participate in the actual trial. This
Chamber would conduct a preliminary review of the evidence and, if
necessary, would certify it to the ICC. This draft further provides
for a public prosecutor responsible for filing an indictment of the
accused with the ICC and for conducting actual prosecution. 2 9
The 1984 ILA Draft contains a similar structure. It provides for
an International Commission of Criminal Inquiry to examine the
criminal complaint, and to either terminate the inquiry, declare the
matter settled by consent of all parties, or recommend that a public
prosecutor prepare an indictment and conduct the prosecution.23 0
A more ambitious scheme is envisioned in the Apartheid Draft
and in the Havana Draft. These drafts provide for four ICC organs:
judges, a secretariat, a standing committee, and a procuracy. 23 ' The
judges are empowered with basic judicial functions,2" 2 and the secretariat's activities are primarily ministerial in nature." The concept
of a standing committee represents a departure from preceding ICC
drafts. Consisting of representatives appointed by each nation party
to the ICC, the standing committee is specifically assigned a specific
function under the terms of the draft, including the election of
judges and a procurator, as well as functions relating to mediation
and general assistance..

3 4

One of the more promising proposals relates to the procuracy,
which attempts to integrate the functions of diverse legal systems.
This body is envisioned as consisting of three divisions: investigative,
prosecutorial, and administrative.23 5 The procuracy in the Apartheid
and Havana drafts has been considered the embodiment of European-Socialist, Romanist-Civilist, and Common Law principles of investigation and prosecution.23 6
The role of a procuracy fashioned in this manner might be cynically considered as a grandiose attempt to woo nations into the ICC
For a discussion of the successful use of assessors in the mixed courts of Egypt, see infra note
225, at 76.
229. 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 36, art. 33, at 25.
230. See 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 48, arts. 27, 31, at 288, 289.
231. See Havana Draft, supra note 45, arts. 23-26, at 37-43; Apartheid Draft, supra
note 46, arts. 3, 14-17, at 548, 553-56.
232. See Havana Draft, supra note 45, art. 23, at 37, 38; Apartheid Draft, supra note
46, art. 14, at 553, 554.
233. Havana Draft, supra note 45, art. 25, at 41; Apartheid Draft, supra note 46, art.
14, at 555.
234. Havana Draft, supra note 45, art. 26, at 42; Apartheid Draft, supra note 46, art.
17, at 555, 556.
235. Havana Draft, supra note 45, art. 24, at 40; Apartheid Draft, supra note 46, art.
15, at 554, 555.
236. Apartheid Draft, supra note 46, commentary to art. 3, at 574.
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fold by offering elements of their respective legal systems. Skepticism may be compounded by the belief that the criminal procedures
of different nations are based upon profoundly diverse, and potentially irreconcilable, political and social features.2" 7 However, the judicial organs which would ultimately be the building blocks of any
ICC would be, ipso facto, the product of many nations and cultures.
Therefore, the idea of judicial organs such as the procuracy of the
Apartheid and Havana Drafts should not be summarily dismissed.
The diversity of legal systems could be put to the advantage of an
ICC, instead of being deemed a constantly aggravating obstacle.23
The most artfully constructed ICC with the ablest jurists in the
world would be rendered ineffective if it were to lack a reliable procedure to coordinate its operations with the nations under its jurisdiction. The issue of national assistance -has been considered from
several perspectives. The Apartheid and Havana Drafts, for example, require that nations shall provide an ICC with all means of legal
assistance in accordance with the domestic legislation of the requested nations, and shall enact appropriate implementing legislation
when necessary. 3 9 Meanwhile, the 1953 ILC Draft adopts a more
guarded approach. It provides that an ICC may request national authorities to assist in the performance of duties, and that a nation's
methods of assistance are to conform with any convention or instrument under which the nation has accepted the obligation. 240 The approach of the 1953 ILC Draft has been criticized as being overly
cautious. It has been argued that if a nation has become a party to
the statute conferring jurisdiction and as elected to submit a specific
case to an ICC, then it would be inconsistent with proper procedure
241
if it did not then offer assistance to an ICC.
Notwithstanding this apprehension, the proposal for a separate
instrument articulating the specific means of assistance between a
nation and an ICC has merit. The ILC has expressed the justifiable
concern that if a nation's decision to confer jurisdiction on an International Criminal Court should automatically involve a duty of assistance, the decision to confer jurisdiction may be perceived as too onerous. 242 The ILC has further noted that there is nothing to preclude
a nation from including in the instrument conferring jurisdiction a
237. See Volkman, Continental European Procedures: True or Elusive Model?, 9 Am.J.
CRIM. L. 1, 31 (1981).
238. See generally Reid, The Ombudsman's Cousin: The Procuracy in Socialist States,
1986 PuB. L.3 (Discussion of the possibilities for using the procuracy of Socialist nations as a
model to complement Western Legal systems.).
239. Havana Draft, supra note 45, art. 29, at 50; Apartheid Draft, supra note 46, art.
29, at 569.
240. 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 36, art. 31, at 25.
241. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 175, at 556.
242. 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 36, commentary to art. 31, at 17.
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separate obligation to render assistance.24 3
Whether in the instrument conferring jurisdiction or in a separate instrument, the delineation of the means and the extent of assistance to an ICC would serve more than a reassurance to a nation
that the process of conferring jurisdiction would not be onerous, as
the ILC has suggested. This delineation would, moreover, provide a
practical method of clarifying a nation's obligation to an ICC
through precise documentation of the terms *for state assistance,
thereby defusing the perception that state assistance to an international tribunal might infringe on sovereign judicial authority.
At its inception, and for some time thereafter, an ICC would
likely rely on the assistance in a variety of operations which might
eventually come under an ICC's control. Reliance upon state assistance would be especially important in matters relating to the arrest
of an accused, securing testimony and evidence, and sentencing and
incarcerating a convicted defendant. Some proposed models for international criminal tribunals, such as the Apartheid Draft, contain
broad provisions relating to state assistance, which would require nations to provide an Apartheid Court with all necessary means of judicial assistance, including letters rogatory, service of writs, assistance in obtaining testimony and evidence, and the transmittal of
records to the Court." Nations would be required to recognize the
Court's judgments2 4 5 and, if no penal facilities were available to the
Court, a nation party to the Apartheid Convention might be requested to execute sentence "in that party's correctional system." 4 ,
Whether an ICC would be truly international in scope would be
dependent upon the extent of state assistance. If, as in the above
example of an Apartheid Court, elements such as enforcement and
punishment were relegated to Member States, an ICC could be perceived as "semi-international" in nature, whereby "the procedure
could be international but the enforcement is kept in national
hands."2 "7 Alternatively, an ICC could be "internationalized en24 8
tirely," and require its separate police force and prisons.
From a practical standpoint, some measure of state assistance to
an ICC would be useful. It may, nonetheless, be advisable to circumscribe the scope of state cooperation in certain instances. For example, state assistance to an ICC through incarceration of ICC defend1953 ILC Draft, supra note 36,
Apartheid Draft, supra note 46,
Apartheid Draft, supra note 46,
Apartheid Draft, supra note 46,
See statement of Professor Paul
TURY: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS A
LEGAL EXPERTS 48 (B. Ferencz ed. 1991).
248. Id. at 48.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

commentary to art. 31, at 17.
art. 29, at 569.
art. 30, at 569.
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ants in domestic correctional facilities, while obviating the necessity
to construct international prisons,24 9 has possible pitfalls. From a
U.S. perspective, the placement of prisoners convicted by an ICC in
federal or state prisons might raise the objection that only U.S. law
could be controlling over punishments executed within this country. 250 Furthermore, from a purely political perspective, housing internationally convicted prisoners in domestic correctional facilities
may foster the perception that the ICC system is more a body of
domestic, rather than international, origin. In certain instances, it
may be more productive to create specific ICC facilities, such as an
ICC prison, at a site recognized for its reputation as a center of international conferences and negotiations, such as in Geneva, or at
the Hague.2"'
Apart from ICC coordination with individual nations, an ICC
would be well served by coordination mechanisms with international
organizations. For example, an arrangement with Interpol may be of
great use. The idea of Interpol serving as some type of international
police force for an ICC is unrealistic. Its ability, however, to serve as
a worldwide informational exchange operation for an ICC could be
invaluable. In 1981 Andre Bassard, Secretary General of Interpol,
envisioned a future where criminals would be pitted "against a
superagent, a citizen of the World with a UN passport., having no
allegiance to any particular country. ' 252 Interpol may never play
such a dramatic role in assisting an ICC. Interpol, as well as other
international organizations, nonetheless, may be accorded significant
roles in combatting international crime.
VI.

Conclusion

As the twentieth century draws to an end, the prospect for an
International Criminal Court is dependent upon the ability to avoid
the seduction of idealistic visions of a sweeping judicial order. Considering the continuous obstacle of state sovereignty, the focus for an
ICC should be for a far more modest scheme. If such a court is
perceived as equitable and efficiency in the dispensation of justice, it
will lay the groundwork for a broader ICC.
The ICC should, therefore, have a limited subject matter jurisdiction, possibly including certain international crimes relating to illegal narcotics trafficking or certain acts of terrorism, which are currently the subject of multilateral conventions. Inclusion of war
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 49.
L. HENKIN, supra note 173.
See Wood, International Criminal Procedure in TOWARD
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 292 (J.Stone & R. Woetzel eds. 1970).
252. Inside Interpol, WORLD PRESS REV., Jan. 1981, at 12.
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crimes, crimes against peace, and other crimes with political overtones should, for the time being, not be under an ICC's jurisdiction.
Awaiting United Nations development of a crimes code as a condition precedent to the creation of an ICC will foster an indefinite delay. Indeed, current proposals which envision an ICC developed entirely by convention, with United Nations coordination provided by
express provisions, is an increasingly attractive option.
The ICC should have jurisdiction solely over individuals, and
with the approval of both the nation of which the defendant is a
national and the nation where the alleged crime occurred. The criminal procedure of an ICC should be flexible, possibly consisting of a
separate process designed for an ICC, or several such processes reflecting the world's major legal systems.
An ICC should be a creation separate from the International
Court of Justice, and should be comprised of judges who represent a
diversity of legal systems and who have practical experience in the
practice of criminal law. Panels of assessors should be appointed to
assist ICC judges. The various bureaucratic organs comprising an
ICC should be accorded some flexibility. For example, the creation
of a procuracy with separate investigative, prosecutorial, and administrative departments, could prove to be an efficient tool. However,
regardless of the type of bureaucracy finally agreed upon, the
method of cooperation between nations and an ICC on such critical
issues as arrest, evidence gathering, and incarceration of prisoners
should be clearly defined.
The satisfactory resolution of these issues is critical to the ultimate success of an International Criminal Court. Nonetheless, a
mere resolution of the mechanical and procedural aspects of an ICC
will be woefully insufficient and on its own will do nothing to advance an ICC's successful operation. Numerous proposals have been
debated for decades and have met fates not dissimilar to the United
Nations' draft code of offenses initiatives of the 1950s that had "lain
dormant in the drawers of the Secretariat and gathered dust on the
library shelves." 2 53 Nothing short of a major philosophical restructuring of the role of an international criminal tribunal is necessary. 5 ' Those who continue to debate the advantages and disadvan253. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 175, at 597, 598.
254. World, supra note 52, at 558 (emphasis added). Professor Gardner's endorsement
of international organizations of limited jurisdiction is appropriately related to the philosophical approach for development of an ICC when he stated that:
[Tihe "house of world order" will have to be built from the bottom up
rather than from the top down. It will look like a great "booming, buzzing confusion," to use William James' famous description of reality, but an end run
around national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, will accomplish much
more than the old fashioned frontal assault (emphasis added).
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tages of an ICC would do well to heed the observations of Professor
Myres S. McDougal who, in discussing public world order, admonished against the use of metaphysical absolutes and procedural gimmickry at the expense of a "continuous clarification of fundamental
goal values in terms of particular problems for particular
contexts." 2 5
If drawing upon the past may be of assistance in the "clarification of fundamental goal values" for an ICC, the example of the
mixed courts of Egypt merits consideration. 5 These courts, in operation from 1875 until 1948, were not technically international
courts, as they draw their authority from Egypt.2 5 7 As a jurisdictional basis, they had cases of "mixed interest," covering civil and
commercial litigation between foreigners and natives, and cases between foreigners of different nationalities.25 The courts also had a
limited, and somewhat less successful, criminal jurisdiction. 5 9 The
judges, selected by the King of Egypt, were Egyptians as well as
foreigners.26 0 Though the concept of these courts was initially perceived by Western nations as an unworkable intrusion upon their
consular courts, the mixed courts flourished and served to enhance
" '
foreign investment and trade, as anticipated by its creators. 26
Attempts to exact a specific comparison between the Egyptian
mixed courts and any proposed International Criminal Court would
be strained. However, if the mixed courts can serve as an illustration
of the will of sovereign nations to overcome entrenched apprehensions and form a consensus for a novel, hybrid judiciary for mutual
benefit, such an example could serve as an inspiration for the framers of an ICC.
As the past provides sources of inspiration, the present provides
sources of opportunity. This article has addressed the receptiveness
of some world leaders to the prospects of an ICC. All that can be
added is the growing conviction that supranational institutions may
be best suited to address a variety of problems crossing national
frontiers. 6 2 Is it not reasonable to assume that a viable ICC would
be integral to that vision?
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote that "[i]t is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than so it was laid down at
255. McDougal, The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A Policy Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L. REV. 25, 92 (1959).
256. See J. BRINTON, THE MIXED COURTS OF EGYPT (1968).
257. Id. at II, 12.
258. Id. at 60-71.
259. Id. at 177-24.
260. Id. at 44-55.
261. Id. at 210.
262. Silk, The "New Order" is a Taller Order, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1991, at El, col.
I; E5, col. 4.
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the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.11113 Perhaps a corollary to
Justice Holmes' observation is'that the reluctance to advance a rule
of law, or a legal concept, simply because it is not ground in established ancient antecedents, should be treated with equal revulsion.
To find the idea of an International Criminal Court to be forever
incompatible with present realities or, perhaps, far worse, to consign
it to some amorphous and undefined future era is to fall too readily
into a blind imitation of the past. To find the idea within the grasp
of our generation is to strike out on another and more productive
course entirely.

263. O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in
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